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I. INTRODUCTION 
Relocation cases . . . present some of the knottiest and 
most disturbing problems that our courts are called upon 
to resolve.  In these cases, the interests of a custodial 
parent who wishes to move away are pitted against those 
of a noncustodial parent who has a powerful desire to 
maintain frequent and regular contact with the child.  
Moreover, the court must weigh the paramount interests 
of the child, which may or may not be in irreconcilable 
conflict with those of one or both of the parents.1
 
 
One of the thorniest, most difficult areas in family law involves 
the situation where one parent desires to change the child’s 
permanent residence to a location a great distance away from the 
other parent.  Traditionally, these cases have involved an out-of-
state move, but, as practitioners have long known, an in-state move 
involving substantial distances can be as traumatic to the family as a 
short move to a neighboring state.   
Minnesota relocation law, like that of many states, requires a 
different analysis depending on whether the relocation in question 
is post-decree or in an initial custody determination and whether 
the relocation is in-state or out-of-state.  In 2006, Minnesota’s long-
standing statute governing out-of-state moves was amended, 
overruling ingrained case law.  However, no similar statute 
specifically addresses in-state moves.  Therefore, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals recently attempted to clarify the in-state 
relocation issue.   
On March 10, 2009, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed 
the notion of in-state relocation in an initial custody determination.  
In Schisel v. Schisel,2 the court erred by applying a standard without 
statutory authority, based on archaic social sciences and case law.3
 
 1. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 148 (N.Y. 1996). 
  
Although the Schisel court correctly determines that the best-
interests-of-the-child standard applies, it errs in using an additional 
 2. 762 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
 3. See infra Part III.   
2
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“necessary” standard to determine in-state relocation.  In an initial 
custody determination involving in-state relocation, only the best-
interests-of-the-child standard should be applied.   
Part two of this note provides a review of the precedent prior 
to Schisel.4 Part three describes the facts, procedure, and analysis of 
the Schisel opinion.5  Part four explains how the Schisel court erred 
in applying an additional “necessary” standard.6  Finally, the note 
concludes with an analysis of how Schisel should have been decided 
and the future of in-state relocation cases in Minnesota.7
II. MINNESOTA RELOCATION STANDARD 
 
Relocation has been a puzzling and dynamic issue for 
Minnesota courts over the years; therefore, a proper understanding 
of the present state of the law in this area requires a review of the 
precedent.  Because little Minnesota case law specifically addresses 
the notion of in-state relocation, out-of-state relocation case law 
provides the foundation for its analysis.   
A. The Auge Presumption 
The most significant case regarding Minnesota relocation law 
was decided over two decades ago.  In Auge v. Auge, the mother, 
who had been awarded sole legal and physical custody, moved the 
district court to allow her child to accompany her to Hawaii for 
part of the year.8  The trial court denied the motion, partially 
because there was no “deep business necessity” for traveling to 
Hawaii each year.9  Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that the custodial parent had the presumptive right to travel,10 
and the parent opposing the move had the burden of showing that 
removal was not in the best interests of the child and that removal 
“would endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.”11
 
 4. See infra Part II. 
  The 
 5. See infra Part III.  
 6. See infra Part IV.  
 7. See infra Conclusion. 
 8. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn. 1983).  For a review of 
Minnesota relocation law prior to Auge, see generally Robert E. Oliphant, 
Minnesota’s Custody Relocation Doctrine: Is There a Need for Change?, 28 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 723, 730–32 (2001).   
 9. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 395 (emphasis added).     
 10. Id. at 399.   
 11. Id. at 395.   
3
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presumptive right to travel was based upon the theory that the 
minor child and the custodial parent formed a new family-unit, a 
theory that predominated at the time.12
Given the inadequacy of judicial determinations as to the 
best interests of the child, and given that one of the few 
guidelines we have is the fact that continuity and stability 
in relationships are important for the child, courts should 
be restricted in their authority to interfere with post-
divorce family-unit decision-making. Decisions concerning 
the welfare of the child should be left to the custodial 
parent who, by virtue of his or her relationship with the 
child, is best-equipped to determine the child’s needs.  
The custodial parent should be permitted to decide where 
he or she and the child will reside . . . .
  The Auge court stated,  
13
Two years later, in 1985, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
addressed the issue of relocation again.
   
14  In Sefkow v. Sefkow, the 
district court granted custody of one child to Ms. Sefkow on the 
condition that she remain “in either Fergus Falls or the Fargo-
Moorhead area.”15  The Minnesota Court of Appeals invalidated 
this provision, stating, “[U]nnecessary limits on movement of the 
family unit unlawfully interfere with the stable circumstances of a 
child.  Removal will be prohibited if it is shown that it contradicts 
the best interests of a child . . . .”16  In its opinion, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals gave “unyielding heed to Auge.”17
Following Sefkow, a trio of cases further solidified the 
prohibition against in-state geographic restrictions.  In Bateman v. 
Bateman, the trial court granted the custodial mother joint physical 
and legal custody of two minor children while requiring her to 
  Indeed, courts 
predominately applied Sefkow for years stating that in-state 
relocation requests at the time of an initial custody determination 
were contrary to law and impermissible. 
 
 12. Oliphant, supra note 8, at 736.   
 13. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399 (citing Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial 
Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 363 (1981) (footnote 
omitted)).   
 14. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) remanded on other 
grounds, 374 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1985).  The Sefkow marital dissolution proceeding 
lasted four years with three separate appeals.  The Schisel decision relies on the 
second Sefkow appeal.  See infra Part III.   
 15. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d at 46.   
 16. Id. (citing Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397, 399) (emphasis added).  See also 
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1988).   
 17. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d at 46.   
4
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reside in the St. Cloud School District.18  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that “the trial court’s residential 
restriction is contrary to law, it is an impermissible limit . . . .”19
Again in 1986, the Minnesota Court of Appeals overturned an 
in-state geographic restriction.  In Ryan v. Ryan, the trial court 
mandated that the custodial mother reside in the city of Aitkin as a 
condition of her receiving sole physical custody.
 
20  The appellate 
court found this restriction to be “impermissibly restrictive” and 
“contrary to the presumption favoring removal.”21
Finally, in Imdieke v. Imdieke, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
once again found an in-state restriction to be impermissible.
 
22  The 
court held, “To base custody or care on a parent’s remaining in a 
certain area is a restrictive condition contrary to Minnesota law.”23
In 2006, the Minnesota legislature replaced the Auge 
presumption in favor of removal with the best-interests-of-the-child 
standard.  On May 31, 2006, the Minnesota legislature passed into 
law Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 3.
  
All three cases relied on the new family-unit theory established by 
Auge.  Additionally, all three cases stood for the proposition that in-
state geographic restrictions were impermissibly restrictive and 
contrary to Minnesota law.   
24
 
 18. Bateman v. Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
  The statute 
 19. Id. at 251 (citing Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d at 47).   
 20. Ryan v. Ryan, 383 N.W.2d 371, 372 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).    
 21. Id. (citing Sefkow, 378 N.W.2d at 74; Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240; and Auge, 
334 N.W.2d 393).   
 22. Imdieke v. Imdieke, 411 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 23. Id. at 244 (citing Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393).  Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 
626, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), criticizes the proposition stated in Imdieke as 
“dictum and without basis in the law.”  However, the Imdieke proposition was 
effectively overruled, as discussed later. See infra Part IV.A. 
 24. In 1971, section 518.175, subdivision 3, was enacted to read, “The 
custodial parent shall not move the residence of the child to another state except 
upon order of the court or with the consent of the noncustodial parent, when the 
noncustodial parent has been given visitation rights by the decree.”  1971 Minn. 
Laws 352.  The section has been amended six times since its enactment.  It was first 
amended in 1978 by adding the phrase “or more than 100 miles within this state” 
after the word “state.”  1978 Minn. Laws 1078–79.  A year later, the phrase was 
removed.  1979 Minn. Laws 566.  The legislature added the sentence “[I]f the 
purpose of the move is to interfere with visitation rights given to the noncustodial 
parent by the decree, the court shall not permit the child’s residence to be moved 
to another state,” to the end of section 518.175.  1982 Minn. Laws 992.  In 2000, 
the words “visitation rights” were replaced with “parenting time.”  2000 Minn. 
Laws 1001.  The 2001 amendment further neutralized the reading of section 
518.175, subdivision 3, by omitting the words “custodial” and “noncustodial,” 
which describe the child’s relationship with each parent, and replacing the words 
5
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amended the standard for a custodial parent moving with a child 
from the state of Minnesota.  This change represents a significant 
departure from prior Minnesota statutory and case law which 
presumed that a parent with physical custody would be able to 
move the minor child from the state of Minnesota.  The new statute 
requires the district court to apply a best-interests standard when 
considering a request of a parent to move the child’s residence 
from Minnesota.25  These best-interests factors, which are not the 
same as the best-interests factors used in initial custody 
determinations, are contained in section 518.175, subdivision 3, 
and pertain specifically to cases in which a parent requests to move 
a child’s residence to another state.26  The factors, as stated in 
section 518.175, subdivision 3, are directly related to the 
circumstances surrounding the move.  Furthermore, the current 
statute places the burden of proof directly upon the parent 
requesting the move unless that person has been the victim of 
domestic abuse, in which case the burden shifts to the non-
relocating parent.27
B. The LaChapelle Locale Restriction 
   
As opposed to the Auge presumption favoring removal, a locale 
restriction is a grant of custody conditioned upon a custodial 
parent remaining in a specific geographic area.28  A locale 
restriction is included in the custody order by judgment or 
stipulation of the parties.29  Therefore, the party requesting 
relocation must bring an order for modification of custody, which 
has a higher standard for modification, in post-decree relocation 
requests.30
 
with “with whom the child resides” and “other,” respectively.  Additionally, the 
2001 amendment replaced the word “when” with “if.”  2001 Minn. Laws 146.   
   
 25. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3(b) (2009).   
 26. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3 (2009).   
 27. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3(c) (2009).   
 28. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 162–63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).   
 29. In re Marriage of Goldman, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2008) 
(Goldman II). 
 30. Id.  (stating that “the defining feature of a locale restriction is that it is 
included in the custody order and thus cannot be eliminated unless a party meets 
the heightened standard for custody order modification under section 
518.18(d)”).  When making a motion for modification of custody, the moving 
party must show endangerment of the child, whereas the best interest of the child 
standard applies in initial custody determinations.  Id.  
6
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In 2000,31 the Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the 
notion of locale restrictions.  In LaChapelle v. Mitten, the biological 
mother, Mitten, was granted temporary custody and permission to 
move to Michigan with her child, pending further proceedings.32  
After trial, the court awarded sole physical custody to Mitten on the 
condition that she provide a permanent residence for her child in 
Minnesota.33  Mitten appealed.34  The court of appeals held that the 
best-interests-of-the-child standard must be applied in initial 
custody determination proceedings.35  The court of appeals also 
found that “[i]n an initial custody proceeding, a trial court treats a 
proposed change of residence by a party as one factor to balance in 
determining custody of a child.”36  The court held that it was in the 
best interests of the minor child to live in Minnesota, not Michigan, 
and affirmed the district court’s conditional custody award.37
The Minnesota Court of Appeals again addressed the issue of 
conditional custody awards and locale restrictions in 2006.  In 
Dailey v. Chermak, the district court granted the custodial mother 
permission to move her minor child from Minnesota to South 
Dakota.
  
LaChapelle represented a significant move away from the new 
family-unit theory and the Auge presumption by no longer 
presuming that a move with the custodial parent was in the child’s 
best interests. 
38  The initial district court ruling stated, “The [c]ourt’s 
ruling on physical custody is conditional upon petitioner 
remaining in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.”39  The court of 
appeals held, “[T]here is no absolute prohibition under Minnesota 
law against awarding child custody on the condition of maintaining 
a specific geographic residence for the child, as long as that 
residence is shown clearly and genuinely to serve the child’s best 
interests.”40
In 2007, the Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the 
  Dailey moved the courts further from the new family-
unit theory and the Auge presumption.   
 
 31. Thirteen years after Imdieke, but six years before section 518.175, 
subdivision 3 was amended.   
 32. LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 157. 
 33. Id. at 158.   
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 162. 
 36. Id.   
 37. Id. 
 38. Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 630.   
7
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applicability of section 518.175, subdivision 3, to relocation cases.41  
In 2002, Deborah Goldman was awarded sole physical custody of 
her son on the condition that she remain in the state of 
Minnesota.42  Four years later, she moved the district court to 
relocate to New York City.43  The district court applied Minnesota 
Statutes section 518.18(d), which addressed the standard for 
modification of custody, as opposed to Minnesota Statutes section 
518.175, subdivision 3, because the motion involved changes in a 
“custody order” or a “custody arrangement.”44  The district court 
denied Goldman’s motion based on a failure to present a prima 
facie case of endangerment.45  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court and remanded with instructions to apply 
the best-interests standard outlined in section 518.175, subdivision 
3.46
Auge established a preference because of the importance 
of a child’s relationship with his primary custodial parent 
under the scheme of Minnesota’s child custody 
statutes . . . And the legislature, although it has modified 
the laws to remove a presumption in favor of the 
custodian’s proposed removal, it has not altered the 
statutory scheme that prompted the Auge court to protect 
the child’s relationship with the sole custodian.
  Additionally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held,  
47
Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the 
district court’s order.
 
48  The court determined that a motion for 
removal by a sole physical custodian subject to a locale restriction 
“falls within the ambit” of section 518.18(d), because the statute 
applies to modification of “prior custody orders” or “prior custody 
arrangements.”49
 
 41. In re Marriage of Goldman, 725 N.W.2d 747, 749 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2007) (Goldman I).   
  Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
determined that the district court had properly applied the law and 
“the defining feature of a locale restriction is that it is included in 
 42. Goldman I, 725 N.W.2d at 749. 
 43. Id. at 750.  
 44. Id. at 752–53. 
 45. Id. at 750.  In relevant part, MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (2009) states, “[T]he 
court shall not modify a prior custody order or a parenting plan provision which 
specifies the child’s primary residence unless it finds . . . (iv) the child’s present 
environment endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the 
child’s emotional development . . . .”   
 46. Goldman I, 725 N.W.2d at 761.  
 47. Id. at 754–55. 
 48. Goldman II, 748 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Minn. 2008).    
 49. Id. at 283. 
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss1/12
4. Niemi.docx 1/4/2010  12:39 PM 
124 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
the custody order and thus cannot be eliminated unless a party 
meets the heightened standard for custody order modification 
under section 518.18(d).”50  Further, the court specifically 
recognized that in circumstances where a custodial parent makes a 
motion for removal of the minor child from the jurisdiction, and 
where there is no locale restriction in the custody order, section 
518.175, subdivision 3, applies.51  Finally, the Goldman court 
expressly rejected the Auge presumption and the new family-unit 
theory by stating, “[O]ur ruling in Auge has no remaining vitality 
because it has been superseded in its entirety by statute.”52
III. THE SCHISEL DECISION 
 
While not specifically addressing a LaChapelle locale restriction, 
on March 10, 2009, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled on an in-
state relocation request in an initial custody determination.53
A. Facts of the Case 
 
On July 21, 2006, Kristine Schisel initiated dissolution 
proceedings against her husband, Daniel Schisel, after eleven years 
of marriage.54  The couple had two children together, ages six and 
eight at the time of the dissolution proceeding.55  Both children 
lived in Mankato, Minnesota, their entire lives.56
Although the family lived in Mankato, Ms. Schisel worked in 
downtown Minneapolis as a real estate agent.
 
57  This entailed more 
than a three-hour round-trip commute each day, Monday through 
Thursday.58  On Fridays, she worked from home.59
 
 50. Id. 
  During the 
divorce proceedings, Ms. Schisel was “adamant” that she be allowed 
to move the children’s primary residence to Lakeville, Minnesota, 
approximately seventy miles north of Mankato, to be closer to her 
 51. Id.   
 52. Id. at 283 n.5 (citations omitted).   
 53. Schisel v. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and Judgment 
and Decree at 8, Schisel v. Schisel, No. 07-FA-06-3017 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 17, 
2007)  [hereinafter Judgment and Decree]. 
 57. Appellant’s Brief, Addendum and Appendix at 7, Schisel v. Schisel, 762 
N.W.2d 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (No. A08-0190). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Judgment and Decree, supra note 56, at 6. 
9
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family and work.60
Mr. Schisel worked as a police commander in Mankato.
   
61  His 
schedule required him to work three rotating twelve-hour shifts, 
beginning at either 6:00 p.m., 3:00 p.m., or 6:00 a.m.62  The 
different schedules, however, gave him almost two weeks off each 
month.63  In addition, Mr. Schisel was an exempt employee, 
allowing him to come and go as necessary, as long as there was not 
an emergency.64
B. Procedural Posture of the Case 
 
At trial, the district court resolved the remaining issues 
between the parties, and despite a neutral custody evaluator’s 
recommendation, denied Ms. Schisel’s request to relocate.65  
Instead, the district court found that it was in the children’s best 
interests to remain in Mankato “because the children [had] been 
ingrained in the Mankato community.”66  Upon a motion for 
reconsideration, the court amended its findings and conclusions, 
providing that it was in the children’s best interests to reside within 
Independent School District 77, the Mankato area school district.67  
Ms. Schisel appealed the decision.68
C. Issue Raised to Appellate Court 
   
On appeal, Ms. Schisel argued that, although there is statutory 
and case law authority for the district court imposing conditions 
and restrictions on a child’s residence, there is not comparable 
authority for in-state conditions and restrictions.69
 
 60. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 268; Judgment and Decree, supra note 56, at 10. 
  She went on to 
cite Sefkow for the proposition that “where an in-state relocation 
[is] requested at the time of an initial custody determination . . . a 
geographical restriction is contrary to law and impermissible, and 
 61. Judgment and Decree, supra note 56, at 5. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Respondent’s Brief, Addendum and Appendix at 4, Schisel v. Schisel, 762 
N.W.2d 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (No. A08-0190).    
 64. Id. 
 65. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 271. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and 
Judgment and Decree at 3–5, Schisel v. Schisel, No. 07-FA-06-3017 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Dec. 18, 2007). 
 68. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 267. 
 69. Id. at 268.   
10
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requires reversal.”70  Ms. Schisel further cited Imdieke, Ryan, and 
Bateman for the same proposition.71
D. Appellate Court’s Analysis 
 
The court of appeals began by rejecting any out-of-state 
relocation cases as controlling because out-of-state relocation cases 
raise issues and complications that would not exist if the requested 
relocation was in-state.72  “Thus, Auge, a case involving a relocation 
from Minnesota to Hawaii, does not control an in-state 
relocation.”73
The court of appeals then analyzed Sefkow as precedent on the 
issue.
   
74  The court noted that the Sefkow decision “relied on Auge 
for the proposition that ‘unnecessary limits on movement of the 
family unlawfully interfere with the stable circumstances of a child,’ 
and held that the ‘residential conditions on the placement of the 
Sefkow children are unnecessary and unlawful.’”75
Nothing in Sefkow creates a blanket rule that restrictions 
on in-state residence are per se unlawful.  Rather, Sefkow 
stands for the proposition that such restrictions are 
unlawful if they are unnecessary . . . .  The later cases on 
which appellant relies [Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke] have 
cited Sefkow for a proposition that is broader than that for 
which the case stands.  Had the Sefkow court intended to 
create a new rule of law, a categorical prohibition of a 
restriction on the intrastate residency of minor children 
in a custody award, it would not have used the qualifier 
“unnecessary.”
  In response to 
this proposition, the court of appeals found that  
76
After rejecting any blanket prohibition against in-state 
relocation restrictions, the court of appeals looked to Minnesota 
Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 3(a)(2) (2008), the statute 
giving the district court the “authority to restrict a child’s in-state 
 
 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.   
 73. Id.  The court of appeals in Schisel also previously noted that Auge had 
been superseded by statute as recognized in Goldman.  Id.  (“[W]hich cites Auge, 
superseded by statute, Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(b), (c) (2006), as recognized in 
Goldman v. Greenwood.”)  (citation omitted). 
 74. Id. at 268–69. 
 75. Id. at 269. 
 76. Id. 
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residence.”77  The statute states, “[I]n a dissolution . . . the court 
shall make such further order as it deems just and proper 
concerning . . . [the minor children’s] physical custody and 
residence.”78  The court of appeals went on to explain that “[t]his 
authority is modified by the fundamental requirement” of applying 
the best-interests-of-the-child standard as codified in Minnesota 
Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1 (2008).79  Citing Sefkow, the 
court finally states that “if there is to be any restriction on the 
children’s residence, the order further requires the restriction be 
necessary to serve the children’s best interests.”80  Therefore, the 
court of appeals held that “the district court enjoys the authority to 
restrict the in-state residence of a minor child upon a showing that 
the restriction is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.”81
E. Appellate Court’s Holding 
   
The Minnesota Court of Appeals found the district court’s 
finding that “the children have been ingrained into the Mankato 
community” was “insufficient to demonstrate a necessity for a 
geographical restriction on the children’s primary residence.”82  
The case was remanded for further consideration of the issue.83
 
 77. Id.  
   
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).  Additionally, the Schisel court used THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1535 (3rd ed. 1992) to 
define “residence” more commonly as a place, or geography, and not with whom 
the child is to live.  Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 269–70. 
 82. Id. at 271 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id.  On July 30, 2009, the district court filed an Order on Remand and 
Amended Judgment and Decree.  Order on Remand and Amended Judgment and 
Decree, Schisel v. Schisel, No. 07-FA-06-3017 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 30, 2009).  In the 
order, the court amended its previous findings of fact in order to show the in-state 
geographic restriction was “necessary,” although it “believe[d] the appellate court 
may have misconstrued [its] reliance on the fact that the children had been 
‘ingrained’ in the [Mankato] community.”  Id. at 2, 13.  The amended findings of 
fact stated that the proposed move would “significantly and negatively” impact the 
children’s relationship with Mr. Schisel.  Id. at 2.  The district court noted that the 
parties stipulated to joint physical custody.  Id. at 3.  Joint physical custody occurs 
when “the routine daily care and control and the residence of the child is 
structured between the parties.”  Id.  The district court stated that, as a police 
commander with rigid shifts, it is “uniquely difficult” to establish a parenting plan 
that would give Mr. Schisel “meaningful and frequent interaction with his 
children.”  Id.  His schedule and the proposed move would make “seeing the 
children in the evening difficult when an hour or more commute each way is 
12
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IV. THE “NECESSARY” STANDARD 
The Schisel court applied the Sefkow “necessary” standard to 
determine whether an in-state relocation was in the children’s best 
interests.  This standard, however, is misplaced.  The “necessary” 
burden is based upon statutory and case law that had been 
overruled due to advancements in social sciences.  The “necessary” 
standard therefore reverts to the Auge presumption by creating an 
additional burden on the custodial parent.  Such additional 
burdens skew legislative intent and have little bearing on the 
suitability of a custodial parent to retain custody.  
A. The Sefkow Analysis 
As previously discussed, Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke stood for 
the proposition that in-state geographic restrictions were 
impermissibly restrictive and contrary to Minnesota law.84  
Therefore, if these cases were still good law, Ms. Schisel would have 
been presumptively allowed to move her children to Lakeville.  
However, the Schisel court dismisses these cases as being overly 
broad.85  In this dismissal, the court does not overrule or 
distinguish the cases.  Instead, the court cites Sefkow for the 
proposition that restrictions on children’s residence must be 
necessary to serve the children’s best interests.86
 
necessary.”  Id.  Additionally, the children’s “relationship with their dad would 
change drastically because he would no longer be able to ‘drop in’ at school or 
games or transport them places during his work hours.”  Id. at 4.  However, “if the 
children remained in Mankato, they could continue to have daily or near-daily 
interaction with their father,” enabling both parents to “effectuate their 
agreement for joint physical custody.”  Id. at 3–4.  The district court also found in 
an amended findings of fact regarding child support that “[o]n an annualized 
basis, [Mr. Schisel] will have actual custody of the children 25% of the time and 
[Mrs. Schisel] will have actual custody of the children 75% of the time.”  Id. at 9.     
  This reliance on 
 84. See Bateman v. Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 
(“[T]he trial court’s residential restriction is contrary to law, it is an impermissible 
limit.”); Ryan v. Ryan, 383 N.W.2d 371, 372 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 
trial court’s mandate that mother reside in city of Aitkin “impermissibly 
restrictive” and “contrary to the presumption favoring removal”); Imdieke v. 
Imdieke, 411 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“To base custody or care on 
a parent’s remaining in a certain area is a restrictive condition contrary to 
Minnesota law.”).   
 85. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 269 (“The later cases on which appellant relies 
[Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke] have cited Sefkow for a proposition that is broader 
than that for which the case stands.”). 
 86. Id. (citing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d 37, 46–47 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985)).   
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Sefkow is misplaced, for Sefkow, Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke had all 
been effectively overruled. 
Generally, under the rule of stare decisis, precedent should 
not be easily overruled.87  However, this is not an inflexible rule but 
rather a policy of law.88  Decisions, therefore, may be effectively 
overruled when the conditions in society have changed89 or “the 
statutory or case law on which the decision rests has been altered so 
that it no longer is sustained by such decision.”90
1. Change in Social Science 
 
Originally, Minnesota courts adopted social science theory 
favoring the removal of a child.  The Auge presumption was based 
on social science research which promoted the stability of the new 
family-unit in post-divorce families.91  Indeed, the Auge opinion 
recognizes the “importance of stability in the child’s post-divorce 
familial relationships.”92  The court goes on to state, “[C]ourts 
should be restricted in their authority to interfere with post-divorce 
family-unit decision-making.  Decisions concerning the welfare of 
the child should be left to the custodial parent who, by virtue of his 
or her relationship with the child, is best equipped to determine 
the child’s needs.”93
Over time, advancements in social sciences challenged the new 
family-unit theory.  One commentator found that the research 
upon which the new family-unit theory and the Auge presumption 
relied “ignored the substantial literature on attachment and loss as 
well as research indicating that children are likely to be better 
adjusted when two competent parents are involved in their 
children’s lives than when the children are raised by single 
   
 
 87. Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 66 N.W.2d 763, 770 (Minn. 1954).   
 88. Id.   
 89. Id. at 771. 
 90. Foster v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 264 (Minn. 1956).  
 91. The Auge opinion cites Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: 
Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 361 n.124 (1981); JOSEPH 
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 8–11 (1979); and 
Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 265 (Summer 1975).  Auge v. Auge, 
334 N.W.2d 393, 396 n.3 (Minn. 1983).  These law review articles all support the 
new family-unit proposition.   
 92. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396 n.3.   
 93. Id. at 399 (citing Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: 
Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 363 (1981)).   
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parents.”94  The new research has been adopted by courts across 
the country.95
2. Change in Case Law 
  
Minnesota impliedly adopted this new research in LaChapelle.  
In LaChapelle, the Minnesota Court of Appeals allowed a 
conditional custody award despite a “lack of statutory authority.”96  
Instead, the LaChapelle court found that a proposed move in an 
initial custody determination must be treated as one factor to be 
balanced in determining the best interests of the child.97  
Additionally, the court of appeals in Dailey found “no absolute 
prohibition under Minnesota law against awarding child custody on 
the condition of maintaining a specific geographic residence for 
the child, as long as that residence is shown clearly and genuinely 
to serve the child’s best interests.”98  Finally, in Goldman, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that Auge “has no remaining 
vitality because it has been superseded in its entirety by statute.”99
3. Change in Statutory Law 
  
This series of case law adopted the new theory favoring a best-
interests analysis free from a presumption favoring the custodial 
parent.  Therefore, the new family-unit theory and the Auge 
presumption were overruled by a change in case law.   
Finally, the legislature also adopted this theory.  In 2006, the 
Minnesota legislature moved away from the new family-unit theory 
to the best-interests-of-the-child standard in amending section 
518.175, subdivision 3.100  Prior to 2006, the statute governing 
removal implicitly presumed that removal of the child would be 
permitted unless the noncustodial parent could show that the move 
was not in the child’s best interests and that it would endanger the 
child’s health and well-being.101
 
 94. J. Kelly & M. Lamb, Developmental Issues in Relocation Cases Involving Young 
Children:  When, Whether, and How, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 2 (2003).   
  The Senate Counsel Bill Summary 
 95. Oliphant, supra note 8, at 740–45 (noting that Connecticut, Colorado, 
and New York have adopted neutral approaches to relocation cases). 
 96. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 162–63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).   
 97. Id. at 162.   
 98. Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 99. Goldman II, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 n.5 (Minn. 2008).   
 100. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3 (2009).   
 101. Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641(Minn. 1996). 
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shows the legislature’s intent to replace the Auge presumption and 
the new family-unit theory: 
Section 13 (standard for removal of child) amends the 
general law governing approval of moving the residence 
of a child to another state [Auge presumption and new 
family-unit theory]. The court must apply a best-interests 
standard when considering the request of a parent with 
whom the child resides to move the child’s residence to 
another state. Factors that must be considered are 
specified.102
This amendment constitutes a change in circumstances, 
contemplated and voted upon by the legislature.  Therefore, the 
Auge presumption and the new family-unit theory were replaced by 
advancements in social science, expressly overruled by Goldman, 
and superseded by statute.   
 
Because the Auge presumption and the new family-unit theory 
were overruled, all cases that relied on the Auge presumption 
favoring removal were effectively overruled as well.  Accordingly, 
the Sefkow opinion, on which Schisel relies, gives “unyielding heed to 
Auge.”103  The Sefkow opinion goes on to state, “Auge announces two 
major concepts: First, unnecessary limits on movement of the family 
unit unlawfully interfere with the stable circumstances of a child.”104
Additionally, Bateman relies on Sefkow for its proposition 
against residential restrictions.107F105  Ryan cites Auge, Sefkow, and 
Bateman in its decision. 108F106  Finally, Imdieke applies the Auge 
presumption as well.109F107  Thus, the presumption favoring removal in 
Auge, Sefkow, Bateman, Ryan, and Imdieke was effectively overruled by 
section 518.175, subdivision 3.110F108  Therefore, Schisel, in holding that 
“if there is to be any restriction on the children’s residence, the 
order further requires the restriction be necessary to serve the 
children’s best interest,”111F109 incorrectly relies on a past precedent 
 




 103. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 372 N.W.2d 37, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).   
 104. Id. (citing Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 396–97, 399 (Minn. 1983)) 
(emphasis added). 
 105. Bateman v. Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).   
 106. Ryan v. Ryan, 383 N.W.2d 371, 372 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).   
 107. Imdieke v. Imdieke, 411 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).   
 108. MINN. STAT. § 518.175, subdiv. 3 (2009).   
 109. Schisel v. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss1/12
4. Niemi.docx 1/4/2010  12:39 PM 
132 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
that is no longer good law. 
 
B. LaChapelle Locale Restrictions 
A grant of custody conditional on maintaining a specific 
geographic location in an initial custody determination must be 
based on the best-interests standard free of any presumptions or 
burdens.  A geographic restriction in an initial custody 
determination represents the first step to a locale restriction.  
Without an initial geographic restriction, a locale restriction could 
not exist.  Therefore, geographic restrictions in initial custody 
determinations are per se permissible.  As the court in Goldman 
found, “[T]here is no absolute prohibition under Minnesota law 
against awarding child custody on the condition of maintaining a 
specific geographic residence for the child, as long as that 
residence is shown clearly and genuinely to serve the child’s best 
interests.”110
The initial geographic restriction, however, must be based on 
the best-interests standard.  LaChapelle states,  
 
In an initial custody proceeding, a trial court treats a 
proposed change of residence by a party as one factor to 
be balance in determining custody of a child.  A proposed 
change of residence bears directly on several of the best-
interests factors in section 518.17.  The factors stressing 
stability and continuity of care are of particular 
importance in light of a parent’s proposed move to 
another state.111
LaChapelle involved an out-of-state relocation.  The Schisel court 
rejects any case involving an out-of-state move as controlling 
because “[a]n out-of-state move can raise jurisdictional and legal 
procedural issues, and logistical concerns, such as the retention of 





 110. Goldman II, 748 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn. 2008); Dailey v. Chermak, 709 
N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).   
  However, the Auge court dismissed this argument 
over two decades earlier.  “In the past, removal was commonly 
denied because of the potential loss of jurisdiction over custody 
issues.  This concern has largely been met by adoption in 44 states 
 111. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 162 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing 
Stangel v. Stangel, 355 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), rev. denied (Minn. 
Feb. 6, 1985)).   
 112. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 267. 
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of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.  Further protection 
of the rights of both parents is afforded by the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act of 1980.”113
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently rejected the Auge 
presumption in relocation cases.  In 2007, the court of appeals in 
Goldman found that “[t]he 2006 amendment of section 518.175 
eliminates the so-called Auge presumption, establishing that the 
proponent now must show cause for a removal but that the best 
interests of the child are to govern the court’s decision.”
  Regardless of the distance or location 
of the move, the district court must employ the best-interests 
standard free of any additional burdens or presumptions. 
114  
However, the court goes on to say that “the legislature, although it 
has modified the laws to remove a presumption in favor of the 
custodian’s proposed removal, it has not altered the statutory 
scheme that prompted the Auge court to protect the child’s 
relationship with the sole custodian.”115
Upon appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to adopt 
the court of appeals’ reasoning.  Although not the basis for the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s reversal, the court stated, “We note 
that our ruling in Auge v. Auge has no remaining vitality because it 
has been superseded in its entirety by statute.”
   
116  The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals’ application of the modified Auge presumption 
created an additional burden to the non-custodial parent not 
intended by the legislature.  Similarly, the “necessary” standard 
applied by the Schisel court reverts to the Auge presumption by 
creating an additional burden on the custodial parent.  The Schisel 
court should have treated the proposed move as simply another 
factor to balance in determining who should have custody.117
C. Other Jurisdictions Use of the Necessary Standard 
   
Other jurisdictions have rejected the “necessary” standard.  In 
1996, the California Supreme Court refused to adopt the 
 
 113. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (citation omitted). See generally Russell 
M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982).   
 114. Goldman I, 725 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).   
 115. Id. at 755.   
 116. Goldman II, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 n.5 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted).   
 117. See Stangel v. Stangel, 355 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating 
that “[t]he court should have treated the proposed move as simply another factor 
to balance in determining who should have custody under Minn. Stat. § 518.17 
(1982) [as opposed to applying the Auge presumption]”). 
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“necessary” standard in Burgess v. Burgess.118  In Burgess, the mother 
and father stipulated that they would share joint legal custody of 
the children and the mother would retain sole physical custody.119  
During the initial custody determination, the mother contemplated 
a “career advancing” move from Tehachapi, California, the original 
primary residence, to Lancaster, California.120  The move would 
take the children approximately 40 minutes (of travel time) from 
their father.121
The district court granted the mother’s relocation request, 
finding the move to be in the children’s best interests.
   
122  The 
California Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the order, 
holding that the district court must determine whether the move 
was “reasonably necessary,” with “the burden of showing such 
necessity fall[ing] on the moving parent.”123
The California Supreme Court held, 
  The California 
Supreme Court granted review.   
In an initial custody determination, a parent seeking to 
relocate with the minor children bears no burden of 
establishing that the move is “necessary.”  The trial court 
must—and here did—consider, among other factors, the 
effects of relocation on the “best interest” of the minor 
children, including the health, safety, and welfare of the 
children and the nature and amount of contact with both 
parents.  We discern no statutory basis, however, for 
imposing a specific additional burden of persuasion on 
either parent to justify a choice of residence as a condition 
of custody. . . . More fundamentally, the “necessity” of 
relocating frequently has little, if any, substantive bearing 
on the suitability of a parent to retain the role of a 
custodial parent.124
 
 118. Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).  The Burgess opinion relied 
in part on social science posed by psychologist Judith Wallerstein.  Her Amica 
Curiae Brief first promoted the new family-unit theory.  Robert Pasahow, A Critical 
Analysis of the First Empirical Research Study on Child Relocation, 19 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW 321, 322–23 (2005).  Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New 
Mexico, Rhode Island, and South Carolina have statutes with no presumptions in 
favor of or against relocation.  David M. Cotter, Relocation of the Custodial Parent:  A 
State-by-State Survey, 18 NO. 6 DIVORCE LITIG. 89 (2006).        
 
 119. Burgess, 913 P.2d at 476. 
 120. Id. at 477. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.   
 123. Id. at 477–78. 
 124. Id. at 479, 481. 
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Also in 1996, the New York Supreme Court failed to 
acknowledge the “necessary” standard.  In Tropea v. Tropea, two 
cases with similar facts were combined.125  In each case, the mother 
was granted sole custody of the minor children in the initial 
custody determination.126  Prior to the decision, New York district 
courts applied a three-step analysis in relocation motions.  The 
three-step analysis required looking to the deprivation of the non-
custodial parent and a shifting presumption to the custodial parent 
to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” to justify the move.127  
The third step looked to the best interests of the child.128
In response to this three-step approach, the New York 
Supreme Court found, “The distorting effect of such a mechanical 
approach may be amplified where the courts require a showing of 
economic necessity or health-related compulsion to establish the 
requisite ‘exceptional circumstances.’”
   
129
[I]t serves neither the interests of the children nor the 
ends of justice to view relocation cases through the prisms 
of presumptions and threshold tests that artificially skew 
the analysis in favor of one outcome or another.  Rather, 
we hold that, in all cases, the courts should be free to 
consider and give appropriate weight to all of the factors 
that may be relevant to the determination.
  The court went on to 
hold,  
130
Similarly, the “necessary” standard applied by the Schisel court 
creates an additional burden on the custodial parent.  As the 
California Supreme Court noted, the additional “necessity” burden 
“has little, if any, substantive bearing on the suitability of a parent 
to retain the role of a custodial parent.”
   
131  As the New York 
Supreme Court noted, such presumptions or burdens do not serve 
the children’s best interests or the ends of justice.132  Indeed, each 
initial custody determination should be decided based upon the 
best-interests-of-the-child standard without an additional 
“necessary” standard.133
 
 125. Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 146 (N.Y. 1996). 
   
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 149. 
 128. Id.   
 129. Id. at 150. 
 130. Id. at 151. 
 131. Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 481 (Cal. 1996). 
 132. See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). 
 133. Id.  
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Additional burdens or presumptions create confusion and 
uncertainty.  Although the Schisel opinion defines “residence,”134 it 
creates uncertainty by adding the term “necessary.”135  Dailey 
discusses a medical or educational necessity.136  Auge mentions an 
economic or business necessity.137  Or, as the Schisel court notes in 
defining “residence,” “[w]hen no special or technical definition of 
a term is provided in a statute, we are to construe the term 
according to its common meaning and usage.”138  Not only is there 
no statutory basis for the term “necessary,” it is not ever mentioned 
in section 518.17.139  Accordingly, The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language defines necessary as “absolutely essential.”140
Therefore, the additional “necessary” burden does not serve 
the child’s best interests.  The burden does not have any bearing 
on the suitability of the custodial parent.  The “necessary” 
requirement has no statutory basis and fosters confusion and 
uncertainty for the district courts. 
  
The mincing of definitions creates confusion and uncertainty for 
the district courts.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The Schisel court erred in applying an additional “necessary” 
standard.141  The “necessary” standard is misplaced because it was 
based on inappropriate statutory law, case law, and social 
sciences.142  Additionally, relevant case law dictates that the best-
interests-of-the-child standard must be applied in relocation cases, 
and a potential removal must be viewed as one factor to consider in 
determining custody.143
 
 134. Schisel v. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d 265, 269–70 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
  Finally, other jurisdictions have rejected 
the “necessary” standard because it skews the prisms of justice and 
 135. Id. at 270. 
 136. Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (stating 
that “it is conceivable that a custody award might be properly conditioned on 
maintaining a certain residence because of the availability in that location of 
special health or educational services that the child particularly needs and that are 
not readily or inexpensively obtainable elsewhere”). 
 137. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 395, 400 (Minn. 1983). 
 138. Schisel, 762 N.W.2d at 269. 
 139. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2009).   
 140. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1175 (4th 
ed. 2000).    
 141. See supra Part III. 
 142. See supra Part III.A.1–3. 
 143. See supra Part I.A–B. 
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has little bearing on the suitability of a parent to retain custody.144
Therefore, the best-interests factors of section 518.17 must be 
the only consideration when determining custody and relocation in 
an initial custody determination.
   
145  The “necessary” standard 
creates an additional burden on the custodial parent.146  The 
additional burden may prevent a custodial parent from being able 
to relocate with his or her child while the same custodial parent 
would be permitted to relocate under a best-interests analysis.  A 
district court may also be inclined to place too much weight on the 
alleged “necessity” of the move, essentially allowing a move to 
occur that is contrary to the best interests of the child under a 
straight-forward best-interests-of-the-child analysis.  Despite the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ error in the Schisel decision, the 
misapplication was not prejudicial.147  Had the court relied solely 
on section 518.17, it could have found that the district court’s 
findings were conclusory and demanded further consideration.  
The new “necessary” standard, however, may skew future decisions 
by creating results not contemplated by the legislature.148
 
 144. See supra Part III.C. 
 
 145. See supra Part III. 
 146. See supra Part III. 
 147. See Stangel v. Stangel, 355 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).  “The 
court should have treated the proposed move as simply another factor to balance 
in determining who should have custody under Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (1982).  
However, the court’s application of the Auge presumption was not prejudicial in 
this case.  The record clearly supports the trial court’s decision to award the 
mother custody and to permit her to move with the child from the state.”  Id.  
 148. See supra Part III. 
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